The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory
Manifesto by Kahan, Dan M.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 1 Article 2
Winter 1-1-2003
The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory
Manifesto
Dan M. Kahan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3
(2003), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol60/iss1/2
The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory
Manifesto
DanM. Kahan*
Few issues generate more disagreement between ordinary citizens, or
peril for elected officials, than gun control. But what exactly is the gun control
debate about?
My objective in this essay-manifesto, might be a better description-is
not to take any particular position on gun control but instead to take issue with
the terms in which the gun control debate is cast. That debate, I want to
suggest, has been disfigured by two distorting influences on the rhetoric of
both sides. I will term one the "tyranny of econometrics" and the other "cir-
cumspection of liberalism." Counteracting these influences almost certainly
will not dispel Americans' differences of opinion on guns. But it will go a
long way to making our public discussion of this issue into one that honors,
rather than mocks, our pretension to be a well-functioning deliberative democ-
racy.
The "tyranny of econometrics" refers to the inordinate emphasis that both
sides of the gun control debate place on the tools of social science. Advocates
of control use a diverse array of methods-not just econometrics, in fact, but
contingent valuation studies, public health risk-factor analyses, and the
like-to quantify the physical and economic harm that guns inflict on our
society.1 Control opponents, however, use the same methods to show that gun
control creates even more physical and economic harm by making it harder for
potential victims to defend themselves from violent predation.2
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., PH1LIP J. COOK& JENS LUDWIG, GUNVIOLENCE: THEREALCOSTS 15(2000)
(describing the "burden that gun violence imposes on our society" through "impact on public
health" and "in dollar terms"); Dan Black & Daniel Nagin, Do 'Right to Carry' Laws Deter
Violent Crime?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1998) (interpreting data collected by control opponents
to reach differing result); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086,
1087 (2001) (using sales date for gun magazine as proxy variable); Arthur L. Kellermann et al.,
Gun Ownership as a Risk Factorfor Homicide in the Home, 329 NEW ENo. J. MED. 1084,
1084-85 (1993) (using data obtained from police and medical examiner homicide records and
from interviews of proxies for victims).
2. See, e.g., JOHNR. LoTT JR.,MORE GUNs, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDINoCRIME AND
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I, at least, am not sure who has the better argument here. Indeed, I do not
think that anyone can definitively say, based on the extant social science data,
whether "more guns" produce "more crime" or "less crime."
But one thing I think we can say with confidence is that empirical studies
of this sort-whatever conclusion they generate-cannot resolve the American
gun debate. The reason econometrics cannot persuade, the reason I call
reliance on such data the "tyranny of econometrics," is that this body of work
ignores what that debate is really about: culture.
Indeed, according to a wealth of public opinion research, it is precisely
these sorts of cultural allegiances and outlooks that determine citizens'
attitudes toward gun control. Positions on gun control vary across social
groups, the members of which attach competing social meanings to guns.
Control opponents tend to be rural, Southern or Western, Protestant, male, and
white.3 For them guns symbolize a cluster of positive values, from physical
prowess and martial virtue to honor to individual self-sufficiency.4 Control
proponents, in contrast, are disproportionately urban, Eastern, Catholic or
Jewish, female, and African American.5 They find the cultural significations
of guns to be abhorrent and alarming; they see gun control as symbolizing a
GUN CONTROL LAWS 23-25 (2d ed. 2000) (stating that "only statistical evidence can reveal the
net effect of gun laws on crimes and accidental deaths").
3. TOM W. SMITH, 1999 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION
RESEARCH CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINeS 19-24 (2000), available at www.norc.uchicago.edu/
online/gunrpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY 1999];
TOM W. SMITH, 1996 NATIONAL GUN PoucY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH
CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 5 (1997) [hereinafter NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY 1996];
Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control, 39 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCI. 387,390,398 (1996).
4. See, e.g., WLLiAM R. TONSO, GUN AND SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL AND EXISTENTIAL
ROOTS OF THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO FIREARMS 287-88 (1982) ("Just to hold [a Colt
Model 'P'] in your hand produces a feeling of kinship with our western heritage-an apprecia-
tion of things like courage and honor and chivalry and the sanctity of a man's word." (quoting
gun collector)); JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDERTHE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA 113 (1983) ("The values of th[e pro-gun] culture are best typified as rural rather
than urban: they emphasize independence, self-sufficiency, mastery over nature, closeness to
the land, and so on."); B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, PUB. INT., Fall 1976,
at 61 ("[The gun culture's] model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes care of
himself and his family with no interference from the state."); James D. Wright, Ten Essential
Observations on Guns in America, SOCIETY, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 68 (observing that for control
opponent, the gun "symbolizes manliness, self-sufficiency, and independence, and its use is an
affirmation of man's relationship to nature and to history"). See generally RICHARD SLOTKIN,
GUNFiGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIERN TWENTIETH-CENTURYAMERICA (1992)
(examining historical evolution of pro-gun meanings in American culture).
5. NATIONAL GuNPoUCY SURVEY 1999, supra note 3, at 19-24; NATIONAL GUNPOLICY
SURVEY 1996, supra note 3, at 6; Kleck, supra note 3, at 390, 398.
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competing set of positive values, including civilized nonagression, racial and
gender equality, and social solidarity.6 Once we control for cultural variables,
no significant correlation appears between attitudes toward gun control and
the types of experiences, beliefs, or attitudes that one would expect to incline
individuals either to support or oppose gun control as a simple policy for
reducing crime.'
Oftentimes, disputes in criminal law that seem empirical or instrumental
are really expressive in nature. In such disputes, citizens care less about how
a particular law will affect behavior than they do about what the adoptibn of
that law will say about the authority of contested moral values and about the
relative status of the social groups and cultural styles associated with those
values. The century's long dispute over temperance, for example, can be
understood as an attempt by America's traditional agrarian elite to repel the
challenge to their cultural preeminence posed by a commercial ethos associ-
ated primarily with immigrant, urban Catholics.' Today's dispute over the
death penalty has been described as an essentially "symbolic" one, too, on
which citizens "choose sides" consistent with their cultural allegiances,9 and
on which legislators vote consistent with their desire to apportion status
among competing cultural styles."0 Proposals to ban flag desecration ignite
intense passions because they are understood to be tests of the national
commitment to patriotism and, accordingly, of the status of those for whom
patriotism is an unproblematic virtue." The rule affording mitigation to
cuckolds who kill their unfaithful wives, a staple of criminal law for centuries,
6. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, at 68 (observing that for pro-control individuals,
the gun "symbolizes violence, aggression, and male dominance"); H. Taylor Buckner, Sex and
Guns: Is Gun Control Male Control? (Aug. 5, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review) (finding that aversion to "macho" style and tolerance of
homosexuality predict support for gun control).
7. See Kleck, supra note 3, at 399 (using "nine crime measures" in determining that
support for gun control is not "an instrumental response to crime"); see also Dan M. Kahan &
Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion, 151 U. PA. L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2003)
(finding strong positive correlations between attitudes toward gun control and individual
cultural orientations).
8. See generally JOSEPHR. GUSFIELD, SYMBoIuc CRUSADE: STATUS PoLiTcs AND THE
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986).
9. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening ofthe Attitudes: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty, J. SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 23.
10. See Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic
Politics, 5 L. & POL'Y Q. 157, 177-78 (1983) (noting that the "inability of Congress to achieve
a compromise on issues ... can often be explained in terms of the symbolic meaning that the
legislation has for certain groups").
11. See generally ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT
1989-1990 AMERICAN FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY (1996).
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now provokes intense disagreement because of the contemporary contest over
the patriarchal norms that the rule expresses. 2
Gun control fits the same expressive pattern. As one southern Demo-
cratic senator recently put it in urging his party to back off the issue, the gun
debate is "about values ... about who you are and who you aren't." 3 Those
who share an egalitarian and solidaristic world view, on the one hand, and
those who adhere to a more hierarchical and individualistic one, on the other,
both see the extent of gun regulation as a measure of their (and their social
groups') relative status in American society. 4 What makes the gun control
debate so intense is not a disagreement about the facts-does private owner-
ship of guns promote or deter violent crime?-but a disagreement about
"alternative views of what America is and ought to be."' 5
Of course, to all of this the econometricians might simply demur. Sure,
they might say, the gun controversy reflects a conflict in cultural world views.
But they cannot hope to make the two sides agree about the nature of a good
society. They do both profess, however, to agree about the value of protecting
innocent persons from harm. So let us continue to focus our attention on the
empirical issue-whether more guns produce more crime or less-as our best
hope to negotiate a peace between the cultural combatants.
The problem with this reasoning, I want to suggest, is that it miscon-
ceives the relationship between cultural orientations and beliefs about empiri-
cal facts, such as whether gun control reduces or in fact increases crime.
Beliefs about the causes and effective responses to societal risks, I want to
argue, derive from cultural world views. As a result, we cannot reach agree-
ment about the consequences of gun control unless we have first come to
some common ground about what values gun laws ought to express.
This is the lesson of the cultural theory of risk perception, a model of
belief formation first used to explain differences in opinion relating to environ-
mental regulation. 6 As with gun control, members of the public disagree
intensely with one another about the hazards posed by various forms of tech-
nology, like nuclear power, and the merits of trying to abate them through
government regulation. The cultural theory of risk perception relates these
12. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269,346-50 (1996) (utilizing this scenario to illustrate "the evaluative
conception of emotion" and "its power to explain the responsiveness of legal assessments of
emotion to changes in social norms").
13. Zell Miller, The Democratic Party's Southern Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2001,
at A17 (emphasis added).
14. Kahan & Braman, supra note 7.
15. Bruce-Briggs, supra note 4, at 61.
16. See generally MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982).
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differences in view to individuals' allegiance to competing clusters of values,
which construct alternative visions-egalitarian and hiearchist, individualist
and communitarian-of how political life should be organized. The selection
of certain risks for attention and the disregard of others affirm (symbolically
as much as instrumentally) certain of these visions over others. Thus, in line
with their commitment to fair distribution of resources, egalitarians are predict-
ably sensitive to environmental and industrial risks, the minimization of which
reinforces their demand for the regulation of commercial activities that produce
disparities in wealth and status. In contrast, individualists, precisely because
they are dedicated to the autonomy of markets and other private orderings, tend
to see environmental risks as low-as do hiearchists, in line with their confi-
dence in and deference to institutions of social authority. Hiearchists and
individualists have their own distinctive anxieties-the dangers of social
deviance, the risks of foreign invasion, or the fragility of economic institu-
tions-which egalitarians predictably dismiss. These conclusions are based
on sophisticated survey techniques that show that differences in cultural
orientations explain differences in individual risk perception more completely
than any other set of factors, including wealth, education, personality type, and
even political ideology.17
It turns out that the gun control debate maps perfectly onto the cultural-
theory-of-risk framework. Like debates over dangers of various environmen-
tal hazards, the gun control debate turns on competing perceptions of risk: the
risk that too many of us will become the victims of lethal injury in a world
that fails to disarm the vicious (or the merely careless), on the one hand,
versus the risk that too many of us will be unable to defend ourselves from
violent predation in a world that disarms the virtuous, on the other. Just like
divergent perceptions of environmental risk, these competing perceptions of
gun risk correlate with opposing clusters of values: egalitarianism and social
solidarity, on the one hand; honor, deference to lawful authority, and individ-
ual self-sufficiency, on the other. These competing values construct alterna-
tive visions of the good society. And in advancing policy positions in line
with their respective perceptions of risk, individuals involved in the gun
17. See Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of
Contemporary Woridviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CRoss-CULTURAL PSYcHOL. 61, 76
(1991) (arguing that cultural biases orient risk perception at the collective as well as the
individual level); Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears
What and Why?, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990, at 50 (stating that "cultural biases provided predictions
of risk perceptions and risk-taking preferences that are more powerful than measures of
knowledge and personality and at least as predictive as political orientation"). See generally
Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role ofAffect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the
Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1427 (1996).
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control debate-like citizens involved in the environmental debate-promote
their preferred vision and discredit that of their cultural adversaries.
These, at least, were the hypotheses that anthropologist Don Braman and
I decided to investigate. We designed our own study to determine whether
cultural orientation measures can explain attitudes toward gun control. And
we found that they do-the more egalitarian and communitarian a person's
outlook, the more supportive of control, but the more hierarchical and individ-
ualistic a person is, the more opposeed to it. Indeed, it turned out that individu-
als' cultural orientations furnished stronger predictions of their attitudes
toward guns than any other facts about them, including whether they were
male or female, black or white, Southern or Eastern, urban or rural, and even
liberal or conservative."'
Insofar as individual attitudes toward gun control fit the psychological
profile associated with the cultural theory of risk, there is essentially no
prospect that econometric and other forms of empirical data will buy us peace
in the American gun debate. The vast majority of individuals lack the exper-
tise to evaluate conflicting statistical studies on gun control for themselves.
Confronted with competing factual claims and supporting empirical data that
they are not in a position to verify on their own, ordinary citizens will natu-
rally look to those whom they trust to tell them what to believe about the
consequences of gun control laws. The people they trust, unsurprisingly, will
be the ones who share their cultural outlooks and who, as a result of those
outlooks, are more disposed to credit one sort of gun-control risk than the
other. In this sense, what one believes about consequences of gun control will
be cognitively derivative of one's cultural world views.
The cultural theory of risk also implies that what individuals believe
about the consequences of gun control will be morally derivative of their
world views. Once the contribution of cultural orientations is exposed, it
becomes clear that those involved in the gun control debate are not really
arguing about whose perception of risk is more grounded in empirical reality;
they are arguing about what it would say about our shared values to credit one
or the other sides' fears in our law. For the opponents of gun control, it would
be a cowardly and dishonorable concession to our own physical weaknesses
for us to disarm all private citizens in the interest of public safety. For the
proponent of control, it would send an unacceptable message of mutual
distrust in each other's intentions, of collective indifference to each other's
welfare, and of the legitimacy of traditional status differentiations to rely on
each citizen's decision to arm himself as a means of keeping the civil peace.
18. Kahan & Braman, supra note 7.
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No amount of econometrics can tell us which of these attitudes about
guns and gun-control risks we should accept. Only a frank and open discus-
sion of what stance the law should take toward the competing cultural visions
that underlie these risk perceptions can tell us. 9 That sort of discussion,
however, is exactly what the second distorting influence on the gun control
debate-the "circumspection of liberalism"-bans from mainstream demo-
cratic deliberations.
Liberal discourse norms that direct those engaged in public debates to
disclaim reliance on contested visions of the good life and instead base
arguments on grounds acceptable to citizens of diverse moral outlooks heavily
influence American political culture.2" Consequentialist modes of
decisionmaking seem to satisfy this standard. Furnishing apparently "objec-
tive procedures and criteria" for policymaking, econometrics, cost-benefit
analyses, contingent valuation studies, and the like are "decidedly divorced
from statements about morality."'" Because they elide contestable judgments
of value, instrumental arguments are the "don't ask, don't tell" solution to
cultural disputes in the law-not just over gun control, but over policies like
the death penalty, hate crimes, welfare reform, environmental regulation, and
a host of other controversial policies.22
Of course, it isn't really the case that we never see appeals to contested
cultural values in such controversies. We are all perfectly familiar, for
example, with what culturally partisan appeals sound like in the gun control
debate: excruciatingly judgmental and intolerant. Control partisans ridicule
their adversaries as "hicksville cowboy[s]," members of the "oversized belt
19. See DOUGLAS & WLDAVSKY, supra note 16, at 73, 80-82 (arguing for discussion of
"what is wrong with the state of society" from an individual's standpoint rather than
"unload[ing] the decision-making process onto institutional processes").
20. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LBERAL STATE 8-12 (1980)
(arguing that a "power structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through a conversation
in which some person (or group) must assert that he is (or they are) the privileged moral
authority"); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, ch. 2, at
5 (1996) (discussing the sense of reciprocity in deliberative democracy as seeking cooperation
on terms fair to all members of society); JOHN RAWLs, Lecture P7, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
at 215 (1993) (stating that "[p]lainly, religious, philosophical, and moral considerations of many
kinds may here properly play a role").
21. Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The Dangers of "Strong" Causal Reasoning in
Social Policy, SOCIETY, July/Aug. 1999, at 39.
22. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The SecretAmbition ofDeterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV.
413 (1999) (discussing death penalty); Rein & Winship, supra note 21 (discussing welfare
reform); Note, The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses and Limits of Science in
International Conservation Decisionmaking, 114 t-Rv. L. REV. 1769 (2001) (discussing
environmental regulation).
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buckle" crowd23 whose love of guns stems from their "macho, Freudian hang-
ups," 4 while NRA President Charlton Heston declares "cultural war" against
"blue-blooded elitists" who threaten an "America... where you [can] ... be
white without feeling guilty [and] own a gun without shame."2 Most citizens
undoubtedly find this culturally chauvinistic style of debate exceedingly
unpleasant. Indeed, it is precisely the judgmental tone of expressive condem-
nation, one would believe, that explains the appeal of public safety arguments
in the mainstream gun debate.
But the hope that the gun control debate can be made less contentious by
confining it to empirical arguments is in fact an idle one. On the contrary, the
unwillingness of most academics, politicians, and ordinary citizens to engage
in a frank airing of their cultural differences ultimately deepens the acrimoni-
ous quality of the gun debate. Most Americans are not cultural imperialists,
but as the gun debate starkly illustrates, at least some are. For them, the
liberal norm against public moralizing lacks any constraining force. By
speaking in the muted tones of deterrence in a (vain) effort to avoid giving
offense, moderate commentators, politicians, and citizens cede the rhetorical
stage to these expressive zealots, who happily seize on the gun debate as an
opportunity to deride their cultural adversaries and stigmatize them as devi-
ants .26
23. Margery Eagan, Rally Proves Gun LoversAre Still Out There, BOSTON HERALD, May
18, 1999, at 4; see also Richard Cohen, The Tame West, WASH. POST, July 15, 1999, at A25
("[Republican gun-control opponents] all pretend to be upholding American tradition and
rights, citing in some cases an old West of their fervid imagination and suggesting remedies that
can only be considered inane."); Ted Flickinger, Letter to the Editor, PrrrSBURGH POST-
GAZET=E, June 1, 1999, at A10 ("The widespread availability of guns in a society in which
many so-called adult males still embrace the frontier mentality makes it a certainty these
periodic adolescent outbursts will be tragically repeated. It's still Dodge City out there, boys.
Wahoo."); Perry Young, We Are All to Blame, CHAPEL HILL HERALD, Apr. 24, 1999, at 4
("[We seem crippled by a mythological 'tradition' (a frontier gun world that ceased to exist 100
years ago and was wrong even then) and bullied into submission by a ridiculous minority of
airheads like B-movie actor Charlton Heston and the National Rifle Association.").
24. Norman W. Nielsen, Letter to the Editor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at B6; see also
Robert Reno, NRA Aims, But Shoots Self in Foot, NEWSDAY, May 2, 1999, at 5H (reporting sign
at gun control rally read: "Gun owners have penis envy").
25. See Charlton Heston, The Second Amendment: America's First Freedom, in GUNS
INAMERICA: A READER 199,203 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999) (exhorting those who "prefer
the America . .. where you [can] pray without feeling naive, love without being kinky, sing
without profanity, be white without feeling guilty, own a gun without shame" to join and "to
win a cultural war"); David Keim, NRA Chief Proves Big Draw at Vote Freedom First Rally,
KNOXv NEwS-SENriNEL, Nov. 2, 2000, at Al ("'Our country is in greater danger now than
perhaps ever before,' Heston warned. 'Instead of Redcoats, you're fighting blue-blooded
elitists."').
26. Cf JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFiNE AMERICA
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In order to civilize the gun debate, then, moderate citizens-the ones who
are repulsed by cultural imperialism of all varieties-must come out from
behind the cover of consequentialism and talk through their competing visions
of the good life without embarrassment. They must, in the spirit of genuine
democratic deliberation, appeal to one another for understanding and seek
policies that accommodate their respective world views. An open debate
about the social meanings the law should express is not just the only philo-
sophically cogent way to resolve the gun debate, it is also the only practical
way to resolve it in terms that embody an appropriate dedication to political
pluralism.
This conclusion presupposes that expressive debate in law can be simul-
taneously pertinent and tolerant. The liberal anxiety that it cannot be-that
the only way to avert "the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all
others"27 is to cleanse public discourse of appeals to contested cultural views
altogether-is far too pessimistic. Anthropologists, sociologists, and compar-
ative law scholars have in fact cataloged many examples of communities
successfully negotiating culture-infused controversies-ones between archae-
ologists and Native Americans over the disposition of tribal artifacts," be-
tween secular French educators and Muslim parents over the donning of
religious attire by Muslim school children,29 and between the supporters and
opponents of abortion rights in France and Germany.3" Rather than hide
behind culture-effacing modes of discourse, the individuals involved in these
disputes fashioned policies that were expressively rich enough to enable all
parties to find their cultural visions affirmed by the law.
321 (1991) ("A ... condition... essential for rationally resolving morally grounded differences
in the public realm would be the rejection by all factions of the impulse of public
quiescence .... [T]here is a tendency among those Americans in the middle of these debates
to hesitate from speaking at all.").
27. Id. at 42.
28. See Gene A. Marsh, Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native
American Remains and Cultural Items, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79,94-101, 109-24 (1992) (detailing
legislation that determines how Americans and Native Americans may treat remains of Native
Americans); Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act: Background andLegislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 45-75 (1992)
(same); see also Robert Winthrop, Resolving Culturally-Grounded Conflict in Environmental
Change (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Washington and Lee Law Review)
(describing cultural dispute resolution techniques used to resolve conflicts over development
of sacred Native American lands).
29. See MARc HOWARD Ross, THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT 5-7 (1993) (discussing
controversy regarding Islamic scarves in French schools).
30. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW ch. 1 (1987)
(discussing the process of forming abortion law in Western Europe).
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I do not mean to understate the difficulty of adapting this strategy of
pluralistic expressive deliberations to the gun control issue. Our society has
grown so accustomed to the constraints that liberalism places on political
discourse that we seem to lack the vocabulary and habits necessary for debat-
ing cultural issues in a constructive way.' When the constraining force of
liberal discourse norms break down, as they inevitably do, we lapse into
acrimony and contempt.
This breakdown is the problem that scholars and others who want to
make a constructive contribution to the gun debate should dedicate themselves
to solving. The construction of a pertinent yet respectful expressive idiom for
debating gun control is a task that will require at least as much energy and
creativity as has been invested so far in the study of gun control's conse-
quences. It is a project, however, in which anthropologists, sociologists, and
philosophers are likely to have a larger role to play than economists.
31. See HUNTFR, supra note 26, at 34 (noting that Americans "lack ways of thinking"
about cultural conflicts).
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